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Our views 19 March 2026

Tyson Foods: A governance story years in the making

5 min read

Tyson Foods (Tyson) is one of the biggest food companies in the world. Its protein products reach millions of consumers every day, and its footprint extends beyond the United States. It supplies several restaurant chains, including KFC, Taco Bell, McDonald's, Burger King, small restaurant businesses, as well as prisons. 

With that scale comes responsibility. Over several years of engagement, our view has been that Tyson’s governance practices have not evolved at the same pace as the environmental and social risks inherent in its operations. 

A turning point at the 2026 AGM 

Our engagement with Tyson has been extensive. Since 2019, we have written letters, held meetings and participated in collaborative initiatives such as Nature Action 100, all aimed at improving the company’s oversight of climate, nature and human rights risks. These efforts set clear expectations. However, we have observed limited progress and responses have been limited.

Last year, we voted against six directors due to concerns about board independence, climate oversight and the company’s complex multi‑class share structure. That vote was intended as a clear signal. With little change noted from our 2024 Climate Transition Assessment, we escalated further at this year’s AGM that was held on 5 February 2026, voting against seven directors to reflect the widening gap between risk and oversight. 

Environmental and social pressures exposing governance gaps 

Tyson’s scale exposes it to some of the most significant environmental and social pressures in global food production. Its supply chain operates in regions where deforestation, water stress and soil degradation are widely documented. These are not abstract concerns. They carry operational, financial and reputational consequences for a business reliant on resilient ecosystems and stable agricultural inputs.

Its supply chain operates in regions where deforestation, water stress and soil degradation are widely documented. 

Governance links these risks together. We view a board with limited independence and concentrated voting power as less able to challenge management, scrutinise strategy or respond decisively to rising risks. In Tyson’s case, we believe that its multi‑class share structure gives the founding family disproportionate voting control through Tyson Limited Partnership (TLP) [1] relative to their economic ownership, reducing the influence of independent investors. An imbalance which makes it harder to demand timely progress on material issues.

Climate 

From our assessment, this becomes clear when examining the company’s climate oversight.  

  • Tyson has set emissions targets but in our view still lacks a credible transition plan showing how those goals will be met.  
  • Without interim milestones, clear indicators or robust board‑level accountability, it is our view that the company remains exposed to foreseeable climate‑related shocks.  
  • A more independent board, empowered by a balanced voting structure, would be better positioned to insist on a credible pathway.  

Nature 

The same is true for nature‑related risks.  

  • While Tyson operates in high‑risk region, we have not identified a publicly articulated biodiversity strategy or clear commitments on soil health or deforestation‑free sourcing. 
  • From our perspective, these gaps reflect a governance framework that has not fully embedded nature risk into decision‑making. 

People 

Our concerns extend into the social sphere.  

  • Recent litigation relating to allegations of child labour has raised questions for investors about the robustness of Tyson’s human rights oversight. 
  • Such risks [2] underscore why strong systems, transparent reporting and effective grievance mechanisms matter. These measures are essential for protecting both the business and the people who underpin its operations.

If this sounds heavy, it is because of the scale of the challenge. In our experience, governance  only rarely fails in a dramatic moment; it fails gradually - weak committee oversight, a missed disclosure, and questions left unanswered. Ignore a warning light in your car because the engine “sounds fine”, and the repair bill may eventually tell a different story. 

Our escalation 

At this year’s AGM, we voted against all governance committee members tp reflect our accumlated concerns.

Tyson needs a board that acts, responds and provides credible oversight. Until that happens, we will continue to hold the company to account. 

Voting complements engagement as an expression of our ownership rights, an escalation tool and a means to express our views and encourage change as an investor. 

Voting decisions

Vote Our vote Rationale
Elect John H. Tyson  Against  We would prefer to see the appointment of a fully independent chair to the board. 
Elect Mike D. Beebe  Against The nominee is a member of the Governance Committee and due to the absence of a credible strategy for its material Scope 3 emissions, the lack of interim 2030 targets, and insufficient progress on nature‑related risk management we continue to hold significant concerns despite multiple attempts to engage with the company. We would encourage the company to establish a meaningful dialogue with us to discuss the aforementioned issues.
Elect Maria Claudia Borras  Against  The nominee is a member of the Governance Committee and due to the absence of a credible strategy for its material Scope 3 emissions, the lack of interim 2030 targets, and insufficient progress on nature‑related risk management we continue to hold significant concerns despite multiple attempts to engage with the company. We would encourage the company to establish a meaningful dialogue with us to discuss the aforementioned issues. 
Elect Maria N. Martinez  Against  The nominee is a member of the Governance Committee and due to the absence of a credible strategy for its material Scope 3 emissions, the lack of interim 2030 targets, and insufficient progress on nature‑related risk management we continue to hold significant concerns despite multiple attempts to engage with the company. We would encourage the company to establish a meaningful dialogue with us to discuss the aforementioned issues. 
Elect Cheryl S. Miller  Against The nominee is a member of the Governance Committee and due to the absence of a credible strategy for its material Scope 3 emissions, the lack of interim 2030 targets, and insufficient progress on nature‑related risk management we continue to hold significant concerns despite multiple attempts to engage with the company. We would encourage the company to establish a meaningful dialogue with us to discuss the aforementioned issues. 

Elect David J. Bronczek 

Against The company maintains a multi-class share capital structure with unequal voting rights and has not provided a reasonable time-based sunset provision on the structure. Moreover, The nominee is a member of the Governance Committee and we continue to note the absence of a credible strategy for its material Scope 3 carbon emissions, the lack of interim 2030 targets, and insufficient progress on nature‑related risk management, despite multiple attempts to engage with the company. Additionally, there is a lack of diversity disclosures. We would welcome engagement to discuss the aforementioned issues. 
Elect Olivia L. Tyson  Against  The nominee is not independent and serves on the Remuneration Committee that lacks sufficient independence. 
Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation  Against  We hold a number of concerns over the company's remuneration framework and practices. Notably, the use of upward discretion on bonuses, retention and one‑off elements, and overall poor alignment between pay and performance. 
Shareholder Proposal: Disclosure of Vote Results by Share Class  For  We are supportive of the request to see more transparency over voting results by share class, particularly for non‑controlling shareholders. 
Shareholder Proposal: Report on Environmental and Health Harms from Waste Lagoons  For  We would welcome additional disclosures in this area given the company's potentially material impact. 
Shareholder Proposal: Report on Impact of U.S. Immigration Policy Changes  For  We would support additional disclosures into this area. 

For details of our voting  please see our voting guidelines, and you can also view our voting records.

At Royal London Asset Management, we exercise our voting rights globally and hold companies accountable for their decisions and actions. The voting process is a powerful tool for potentially influencing outcomes and making relevant decision-makers aware of shareholders’ sentiments on important topics. 

Our voting always aims to be pragmatic, reflective of local best practice and evolving market insights, and in the long-term interests of our clients. Alongside voting, our engagement, research, and advocacy also help to add value and meaning to our investment decisions. Voting and engagements may not always apply to any specific Royal London Asset Management fund or strategy, as each will have different investment objectives. Please check your prospectus for details on specific product objectives.

  1. Disclose votes by share class at TYSON FOODS, INC. | PRI and Who Owns Tyson Foods?
  2. Third Time’s the Charm? The Potential for a DOL Case Against Tyson Foods. - Richmond Public Interest Law Review 

Reference to any security is for information purposes only and should not be considered a recommendation to buy or sell. Portfolio holdings are subject to change without notice. 

For professional investors only. This material is not suitable for a retail audience. Capital at risk. This is a financial promotion and is not investment advice. Past performance is not a guide to future performance. The value of investments and any income from them may go down as well as up and is not guaranteed. Investors may not get back the amount invested. The views expressed are those of the Royal London Asset Management at the date of publication unless otherwise indicated, which are subject to change, and is not investment advice.